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Abstract
We uncover interpersonal violence as a dimension and a mechanism of the re-
source curse. We rely on a historical natural experiment in the United States, in
which mineral discoveries occurred at various stages of governmental territorial ex-
pansion. “Early” mineral discoveries, before full-fledge rule of law is in place in a
county, are associated with higher levels of interpersonal violence, both historically
and today. The persistence of this homicide resource curse is partly explained by
the low quality of (subsequent) judicial institutions. The specificity of our results to
violent crime also suggests that a private order of property rights did emerge on the
frontier, but that it was enforced through high levels of interpersonal violence. The
results are robust to state-specific effects, to comparing only neighboring counties,
and to comparing only discoveries within short time intervals of one another.
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“It is manifest that during the time men live without a common
power to keep them all in awe, they are in a condition which is called
war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every man. [...]
The nature of war consists not in actual fighting but in the known
disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the
contrary” (Hobbes 1651, page 262).
1 Introduction
Why is the homicide rate in the United States more than four times higher than in
Western Europe or other neo-Europes, such as Australia?1 Elias (1994)’s civilizing
process links the decline in homicide to the development of a Weberian state, which
enforces contracts and monopolizes violence, making violence both superfluous and
ineffective.2 In sharp contrast with this view, others argue that self-interest suffices
to sustain a peaceful order, even in anarchy. This is demonstrated, according to
Anderson and Hill (2004) in “Not So Wild Wild West”, by the private enforcement
of property rights in the West of the United States in the 19th century. A closer
look at the evidence in this study reveals that while a private order of property
rights order did exist, it was not peaceful.
The circumstances of mineral discoveries in the United States provide the ideal
natural experiment to examine the relationship between state development and
interpersonal violence. Mineral discoveries generally occurred after the state was
established, but they preceded the state in more than a third of cases. Incorpo-
ration of large swathes of territory in the West took place at the same time as
an intense mineral rush, but for independent, geopolitical reasons according to
Davis (1972). Motivated by the fact that in the United States, contrary to most
countries, individuals own mineral rights, private prospectors flocked to the West,
irrespective of whether the state was already in place or not.3
1This comparison is based on UNODC data for homicide rates per 100,000 people in 2010:
United States: 4.7, United Kingdom: 1.6, France: 1.1, Germany: 0.8, Australia: 1.
2Pinker (2007) observes that homicide has been falling steadily in Europe since the emergence
of modern states in the Middle Ages.
3Lang (1983) (first published in 1882) witnessed how: “Within the short space of half a year
from the discovery of gold in California, extensive prospecting had been done, and the gold-bearing
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In this study, we take advantage of the respective timings of state develop-
ment and mineral discovery in order to test the civilizing process hypothesis. We
track more than 4, 500 mineral discoveries across counties and time, and we match
discoveries with historical county formation from the Atlas of Historical County
Boundaries. Our measure of state development consists of the territorial status of
the place of discovery: colony or state, in which case we consider that discovery
postdates the establishment of the state; territory or unorganized land, in which
case we consider that the discovery predates the state. We regress measures of
crime today on the presence of minerals and on our measure of whether formal
state institutions were in place at the time of the discovery. Our analysis is at
the county level and controls for state fixed effects throughout. We also study the
historical relationship between violence and mineral discovery.
Our results give unambiguous support to the civilizing process. Counties that
experienced mineral discoveries before statehood exhibited higher levels of homi-
cide and assaults, even to this day. Mineral discoveries are associated with about
200 additional assaults and murders per 100, 000 people in 2000 in these early
mining counties – a 40% increase relative to the mean. In contrast, no effect is
observed if discoveries occurred after the state was established.
Our first difference approach rules out the possibility that our results are due to
differences between mining and non-mining areas. However, early and late mining
counties may differ along characteristics that also affect crime, thereby jeopardizing
our identification strategy. A particular concern is that late mining counties simply
have older institutions, and older institutions are associated with less crime. To
address this concern, we control throughout for the initial date of county creation
as well as historical population density, the main driver of county incorporation.
We control for numerous other historical and contemporary county characteristics
that may affect crime, such as income, education, ethnic fragmentation, population
density, and the presence of women. Early and late mining counties do not differ
from one another along any of these characteristics.In addition, the inclusion of
state fixed effects remove the influence of any unobserved heterogeneity across
states related to mineral discovery and to state incorporation. In robustness tests,
we avoid comparing older and more recent discoveries and restrict our attention
territory had been examined for hundreds of miles along the Sierras” (Lang 1983, page 294).
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to discoveries that occur within 5 or 10 years of one another. We also restrict
our analysis to counties within arbitrarily defined geographic areas, as well as to
neighboring counties only. Another potential concern is that territorial status may
reflect not only political but also economic and social development of a county.
The robustness of the results to the inclusion of a battery of historical economic
and social development controls described above alleviates this concern.
Another concern is that miners were negatively selected. Clay and Jones (2008)
argues, to the contrary, that miners were more educated and more likely to be white
collar workers compared with the rest of the population. Moreover, to threaten
our identification, miners should have been able to self select on the basis of the
precise timing of the first discovery relative to state incorporation, within a given
state. This seems farfetched in the context of the mineral rush that was taking
place.
We next turn to the mechanisms that underlie the persistence of violence, more
than a hundred years after the state was established in most places. Initial violence
may have had deleterious effects on the quality of subsequent institutions, through
several direct and indirect channels. Tabellini (2008) and Belloc and Bowles (2013)
suggest that social norms and institutions are complements, so that inefficient
institutions may follow from the tendency to resolve conflict not through formal
but informal, violent means. The use of force may also enable violent agents
to accumulate substantial power, which they can use to corrupt nascent formal
institutions.4 We find direct evidence that the persistence of our homicide resource
curse is partly explained by a political resource curse, namely by enduring lower
quality of judicial institutions. We use the state-level panel dataset of historical
judicial quality indicators constructed by Epstein et al. (2001) and we find that in
late-mining states, discoveries are associated, yearly, with a reduction by between
2% and 5% in various indicators of the independence of state judges.
To the best of our knowledge, our findings document for the first time the
existence of a homicide resource curse, which, like other resource curses, is condi-
tional on the initial quality of institutions. To our motivating question, we offer an
4Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Rajan and Zingales
(2006), among others, discuss the implications of economic inequality for the design of political
institutions
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answer that consists of a combination of the tardiness of the civilizing process in
the United States compared to Europe, and of the shock due to natural resource
discovery, which, as we show, further delayed the civilizing process.5 However,
only violent crime – not property crime – is affected, both historically and today.
The interpretation is that a private order of property rights did emerge even in
the absence of the state, as documented by Anderson and Hill (1979, 2004) and in
Clay and Wright (2005). However, in the absence of third-party enforcement, the
security of property rights was enforced by high levels of interpersonal violence.
The first contribution of the paper is to the literature on the resource curse
and on how initial endowments shape institutions in the long run (Engerman and
Sokoloff 1997, 2002, and Rajan and Zingales 2006). The effect of natural resources
on development outcomes depends on the quality of institutions (Mehlum et al.
2006), and resources have further deleterious effects on institutional quality (Brollo
et al. 2013).6,7 A sizeable literature also finds a positive relationship between natu-
ral resources, in particular oil, and civil conflict (see Ross 2006 for a partial review).
We differ from this literature by focusing on privately rather than publicly owned
resources and on interpersonal rather than political violence. The most closely
related paper is Buonanno et al. (2012), which shows that a resource windfall in
the context of weak formal property rights gave rise to the Sicilian mafia. Our
work differs from theirs in two ways. First, we abstract from the organizational
form that may have substituted for formal, state-based property rights enforce-
ment. Second, and more importantly, we also study the counterfactual situation
in which the resource windfall occurs in the presence of strong formal institutions.
Our contribution to the literature on interpersonal violence is two-fold. We
5Australia, another mineral rich neo-Europe, experienced a less violent fate, not only because
mineral exploitation occurred when state institutions were more developed relatively to the West
of the US, but also because mineral rights in Australia are property of the Crown, making state
presence a prerequisite to mineral exploitation McLean 2013.
6Torvik (2009) provides a review of this literature.
7In the context of the United States, while Wright (1990) argues that natural resources
contributed to the growth of industrial exports, recent literature finds empirical evidence for the
presence of a resource curse (Goldberg et al. 2008). Clay (2010) points out that the differences in
the time periods considered by the two studies (1879–1929 for the first one and 1929–2002 for the
second) may explain these divergent findings. Our investigation covers the whole time period,
as we shed light on crime both at the time of mineral discoveries and today, and we consider a
state panel of institutional quality from the mid 19th century to the present.
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consider a rather encompassing definition of formal enforcement – whether there
is state at all –, and confirm prior evidence that enforcement deters crime, partic-
ularly violent crime (Levitt 1997, Kessler and Levitt 1999, and Draca et al. 2011).
Our interpretation is that the security of property rights is ensured even in the
absence of the state, but by high levels of interpersonal violence. The second con-
tribution is to highlight the importance of reputation as a driver of violence. We
review the theoretical background on this in Section 2. A related paper is Grosjean
(2014), which links homicide in the US South today to the cultural background
of 18th century Scots-Irish immigrants. The underlying assumption is that this
group was prone to violence because it came from lawless areas and relied on eas-
ily stolen resources (Nisbett and Cohen 1996). This paper demonstrates how the
combination of weak formal institutions and easily appropriable resources spurs
violence in the first place.
We also contribute to the economic history literature on violence during the
Gold Rush. In contrast to the popular myth of a lawless and murderous Wild West,
the conventional view in economics is that property rights were secure and violence
rather limited in mining districts (Umbeck 1975, 1981, Zerbe and Anderson 2001,
and Clay and Wright 2005, 2011). While our empirical results support the first
part of this claim, they do not support the second. In that, we agree with historians
of crime in the US, in particular Roth (2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The conceptual background
of rule of law and violence is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 introduces mineral
discoveries data and provides some historical background. Sections 4 and 5 provide
historical and contemporary evidence. Section 6 discusses channels of persistence
and institutional quality. Section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual background
Until recently, economists have essentially focused on expropriation as a motive for
violence. As in Skaperdas (1992) and Gonzalez (2010), several models describe the
incentives to engage in predatory behavior when the rule of law is absent or weak,
as it was in some areas in the West of the US during the Gold Rush (Umbeck
1975). The threat of violence by individuals creates a “semblance of property
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rights,” to use the words of Skaperdas (1992). It is a substitute for formal law
enforcement, albeit an inefficient one, as it involves wasteful individual investments
in force. At equilibrium, property rights are sustained by respective investments
in power.8 A common prediction of these complete information models is that,
in the absence of bargaining inefficiency, force is not used at equilibrium.9 Better
third-party enforcement does not affect (observed) violence but remove incentives
for individual predation. This increases efficiency and affects the division of the
surplus, with the powerful party losing much from the withdrawal of the threat of
violence (Skaperdas 1992).
Other papers have recently introduced other motives for violence. Chassang
and Padro-i-Miquel (2010) show how the presence of strategic uncertainty intro-
duces a new motive for violence: preemption. Players, while second-guessing each
other’s moves, may decide to attack in order to avoid suffering a debilitating sur-
prise attack from an opponent who is expected to be aggressive. Silverman (2004)
formalizes a reputation-based theory of crime in a dynamic game of incomplete in-
formation. When the population contains a fraction of violence-committed types,
normal types may engage in violence in order to build up their reputation and deter
attacks. This “culture of violence” equilibrium prevails if the cost of participating
in crime is low enough, for example, if the state is absent. Perfect enforcement
unravels the culture of violence.10 In Ghosh et al. (2013), repeated acts of violence
build a reputation for being committed to violence, which leads the other party to
concede. The intuition easily applies to a dispute over mineral claims. Signaling
one’s strength and determination with a violent attack will convince other agents
to concede their claims and enable the violent agent to grab a larger share of the
surplus.
This overview of the relevant literature suggests a few testable predictions.
No violence occurs in the presence of a Weberian state, which enforces agreed
settlements and monopolizes violence. In its absence, but with perfect bargaining,
8Investments in force are either symmetric as in Umbeck (1975) and Gonzalez (2010) or not,
with one party specializing in predation as in Skaperdas (1992)
9Actual violence only occurs in the case of limited commitment, as in Gonzalez (2010) or
incomplete information, as in Donohue and Levitt (1998) or Aney (2012).
10However, intermediate policy crackdown can actually increase violence if they strengthen
the signaling value of a violent encounter.
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a “semblance of property rights” prevail and violence is not observed in the process
of expropriation. The only type of violence that is observed in equilibrium aims
at intimidation.
Although very different states of the word prevail in absence or presence of the
state, it is important to note that the result by no means rests upon the compo-
sition of the underlying population to be different, or in applied econometricians
terms, upon selection. In expropriation models, more people commit crime if the
costs of crime are lower, irrespective of their types. In reputation-based mod-
els of violence, normal types may engage in violence when enforcement is absent,
irrespective of the actual proportion of committed types in the population.
Our empirical analysis is primarily focused on present-day outcomes, when the
state has been established everywhere. What could underlie persistent differences?
The first channel of transmission consists of the quality of institutions. A
common prediction of all crime models is that the use of force enables the violent
party to secure a larger share of the surplus. According to Engerman and Sokoloff
(1997, 2002) and Rajan and Zingales (2006), this party is then able to influence
the design of formal institutions to preserve her rents, with negative long-run
consequences on the quality of institutions. The persistence of formal institutions
– documented by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Dell (2010) among others –, implies
that high levels of interpersonal violence also persist over time.
A second channel of transmission is culture. In models of social interactions a`
la Glaeser et al. (1996), violence feeds on itself, so that initial violence can persist
over time. Another possibility is that differences in the quality of institutions give
rise to different cultural norms, which can persist over time, regardless of changes
in the quality of institutions. Tabellini (2008) and Guiso et al. (2008) describe how
parental transmission of preferences depends on the spatial pattern of external en-
forcement and becomes biased towards excessively conservative priors. If formal
enforcement is weak, parents transmit low trust in order to protect their children
from situations in which they would be taken advantage of if they cooperate. This
results in low levels of social trust, which become self-fulfilling, despite potential
changes in formal institutions. The same argument can easily be extended to
aggressiveness. If enforcement is weak at one period of time, the returns to in-
terpersonal violence are high and parents would want their children to internalize
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the benefits of using violence. They transmit norms that legitimize the use of
force. Violent norms also become self-fulfilling, and the strong strategic comple-
mentarity between violent strategies implies that a culture of violence should be
highly persistent. Elias (1994) already had the intuition that state development
affects social norms, as agents internalize the social control of violence. Grosjean
(2014) shows empirically that violent cultural norms only persisted where formal
institutions were weak.
An implication of these models is that institutional and cultural persistence
are complements and not substitutes, as is suggested theoretically in Tabellini
(2008) and Belloc and Bowles (2013). It is neither our goal, nor within our reach,
to identify them as separate channels. Persistent weakness of formal institutions
only make aggressiveness more valuable.
3 Historical background and data on mineral dis-
coveries and the rule of law
As noted by Wright (1990), the most distinctive feature of the American mining
economy was the intensity of exploration and exploitation. This was due to a
particularly rewarding incentive system, as mineral rights were included in the
bundle of land rights (David and Wright 1995). Knowledge of American economic
geography was gained in the 18th and 19th centuries both from public and private
surveying efforts and from unorganized private ventures (Davis 1972). Even though
states and the federal government invested in geological surveys as early as the
1820s – see Clay (2010) for a full list of state geological surveys’ dates –, exploration
was to a large extent a private enterprise, in what has been described as an open
and saturated market by Clay and Wright (2011). Clay and Jones (2008) find
that miners in California in 1850 earned less on average in relative terms than
day laborers in other parts of the United States, confirming that open entry gave
way to a dissipation of rents. Taken together, such a private and massive search
in a market with open entry - the mineral rush– guarantees that specific mineral
discoveries were largely independent of territorial status at the time of discovery,
at least when considering variation within a given state and controlling for a large
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number of observable characteristics.
The Mineral Resources Data System (MRDS) describes mineral resources through-
out the world. It contains more than 25, 000 observations for the United States.
Information about discovery year is available for more than 4, 500 of them. Most
observations for which the discovery year is not available are deposits that were
not worthy of production. As shown in Figure 1, a handful of discoveries had been
recorded before the 18th century but the majority of mineral discoveries occurred
between 1825 and the second World War. For each of these 4, 500 observations,
the dataset contains information on localization, year of discovery and type of
mineral.11,12
The independence of territorial status relative to the time of mineral discovery
depends not only on the specificity of mineral exploration but also on the territorial
expansion of the US government. Davis (1972) agues that territorial expansion
of the United States was largely driven by external geo-political forces, which
were orthogonal to mineral discoveries. California and the Southwest were gained
after the 1846 − 1848 war with Mexico, which originated in a territorial dispute
over the Texas boundary. Within newly integrated states, the main driver of
incorporation was population density (Davis (1972)), which we control for in all
empirical specifications.
Figure 1 illustrates our basic identification strategy: some discoveries occurred
before county incorporation, some after. County creation date is too crude a
measure since one needs to distinguish whether counties were created ex-nihilo or
carved out of an existing politically organized entity. We consider a finer measure
of the territorial status of an area at the time of mineral discovery. We proceed
11Notice that the MRDS does not convey information on the quantities extracted, but this
would be a more endogenous measure, which would be influenced by factors such as security
of property rights. Oil, gas, and coal are not minerals and are not included in the MRDS. We
nevertheless control for the presence of such resources in the empirical analysis
12An alternative source of information on mining activity is provided by occupational in-
formation in the Historical Census, which gives the proportion of people employed in mining
activity and industry (Ruggles et al. 2010). This is, however, a less satisfactory proxy for min-
eral discoveries than physical discoveries for two main reasons. First, people may declare mining
as their activity but may be either unemployed or migrant workers, so that self-declared miners
may not adequately reflect the extent of mining in a given area. Second, the number of miners
in a given region may be endogenous to other regional characteristics, in particular the quality
of institutions. Lastly, Census data, does not make it possible to date mining activity, especially
if it occurred before statehood and the organization of the Census.
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in two steps. First, we map each mineral discovery on yearly maps of the United
States constructed from the Atlas of Historical County Boundaries. Each discov-
ery ends up inside an area that is either on unorganized land or enclosed in some
administrative boundaries. The latter includes colonies, states, and organized ter-
ritories. An organized territory refers to the territorial status between the transfer
of sovereignty to the Union and the actual establishment of formal institutions.
Even though territories are technically under the jurisdiction of the United States,
in practice law enforcement was minimal to non-existent. County jails, sheriffs,
constables, and courts only came with the incorporation of local areas into coun-
ties and state Lane (1992). We consider that discoveries occurring in territories or
on unorganized land – as opposed to states or colonies –, pre-date the rule of law.
We refer to these as early discoveries. Second, we project back each discovery on a
stabilized map of American administrative boundaries. This enables us to observe
whether each county or state ever had mineral discoveries within its boundary and
whether any of those occurred before organization of the land.
We retain two dummy variables that capture an area’s mining and state devel-
opment history. The first takes value one if any discovery ever occurred inside a
county’s boundary. Minerals were discovered in 355 counties in 29 states, 11% of
all US counties. The second takes value one if any discovery occurred inside what
is today a county but was unorganized land or territory at the time of discovery.
This is the case in 126 counties in 15 states, about 4% of all US counties and 35%
of mining counties. Figure 2 maps the counties that had mineral discoveries, and
the category each falls into.
4 Historical evidence
Our work is motivated by explaining contemporary violence, which we explore in
the next section. First, however, we document the historical association between
mineral discoveries and crime.
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4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
The historical crime data used in this study was collected by historians and comes
from the Historical Violence Database of the Criminal Justice Research Center at
Ohio State University. The limitation of this data consists of its limited geographic
coverage and its lack of consistency across different locations. However, it contains
a wealth of details on the circumstances of homicide, such as the occupation of
offender and victim, the place where the homicide took place, and the underlying
motivations.
McKanna (2002) gathered data on the population of homicide, the occupa-
tion of offenders and victims, and the circumstances of homicide in seven Cali-
fornia counties between 1849 and 1899 based on coroner’s reports and newspaper
accounts.13 Gold was first discovered in California in 1848 and statehood was
achieved in 1850. in addition, new state institutions were very slow to be estab-
lished (Umbeck 1975). As David and Wright (1995) note: “the great California
Gold boom occurred under a virtually complete absence of government authority”
(page 218). We match McKanna’s data to the 1% US Censuses from 1850 to 1940
in order to obtain homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants. The average homicide
rate between 1850 and 1899 was higher in the two mining counties of Calaveras
and Tuolumne than in the other, non-mining counties (42.13 per 100, 000 against
32.68, t-stat of 2.33). The correlation between homicide rates and the proportion
of people employed in the mining sector between 1850 and 1880 is 0.82. Miners
were also over-represented as victims and perpetrators of homicide. In Calaveras
and Tuolumne, they represented nearly 73% of perpetrators of homicide, against
50% of the population (t-stat of 4.13).
Another striking feature is that, contrary to the popular view of the Wild West,
according to which expropriation was the main goal of homicide, but consistent
with our stress on intimidation as the main purpose of violence, the majority of
homicide did not occur in the context of expropriation, nor in the mines, but
rather in the context of quarrels. 78% of homicides in mining areas occurred in
the context of a quarrel, against 68% in non-mining areas (t-stat of 1.83), and
13Counties for which McKanna (2002) provides information are: Calaveras, Sacramento, San
Diego, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Tuolumne.
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only 10% in the context of a robbery, a proportion no different than in non-mining
areas (t-stat of 0.04). Only 12% of homicide took place in the gold fields, against
35% in saloons or streets.14
4.2 Regression results
We now turn to more systematic evidence on the short-term historical relationship
between mineral discoveries and violence at the county level. We match McKanna’s
yearly crime data in Californian counties with information about yearly mining
discoveries extracted from the Mineral Resources Data System. Because we have
a yearly panel of homicide and mineral discoveries for these counties, it is possible
to control for common shocks as well as county-invariant characteristics. As such,
we estimate the relationship between yearly homicide and the stock of mines,
controlling for time and county-specific effects:
Homicideit = β0 + β1Stock of minesit + β2Early miningi
+β3Stock of minesit × Early miningi + δi + δt + it,
(1)
where Homicide it denotes the number of homicides in county i in year t, Stock of
mines it is the accumulated sum of mineral discoveries from 1849 to t and Early
mining i denotes the mining history of the county.
15
Regression results are displayed in Table 1. In the first column, the coeffi-
cient associated with the stock of mines is positive and statistically significant.
14McKanna (1997) also gathered data in three counties of Arizona, Colorado, and Nebraska
between 1880 and 1910. In the “early” mining county of Gila (Arizona), the average homicide
rate was 70 per 100, 000, with miners, again, over-represented as victims and offenders (31%
against 18% of the population at large). The homicide rate in Gila was 40% higher than in Las
Animas (Colorado), also a mining county but a “late” one. In Douglas (Nebraska), where no
discovery occurred, the homicide rate was “only” 14 by comparison. As in California, quarrels
were twice as frequently the cause of homicide in the early mining county of Gila (at nearly 70%),
compared to other areas. Robberies, however, were less frequent (3.2% of homicide against 5.6%
in Douglas). In Illinois, where all mineral discoveries occurred after state incorporation, homicide
rates between 1850 and 1890 were not only much lower overall but also displayed a reversed
pattern as the one described so far. Homicide rates were higher in non-mining areas (16.65) than
in mining counties (7.82) (Roth 2009) and miners were under-represented as homicide offenders.
15There is an average of 3.5 homicide per year per county (s.d. = 3.7), and a total of 1.5
discoveries per county over the period (s.d. = 2.8) with a maximum of 11 discoveries.
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Although common time-varying shocks are already taken into account, counties
may have experienced different population growth over the period, which could
also affect homicide patterns. To tackle this issue, we introduce yearly population
as a control variable in the second column. As expected, the estimated coefficient
of this variable is positive and statistically significant. However, its introduction
does not change the magnitude and statistical significance of the stock of mineral
discoveries. The coefficient is roughly equal to one-fourth, meaning that four more
discoveries in a county are associated with one more homicide during subsequent
years. In column 3, we interact the Stock of mines it with the mining history of the
county (Early mining i). The effect of the stock of mines on homicides is higher in
counties where mineral resources was discovered before land organization.
Before turning to the question of whether such violence has persisted until
today and why, we discuss two other sources of data. Vital statistics provide
information on deaths due to violent accidents at the state level since 1900. This
data is of limited use to us for two reasons. First, it is only available at the
state level. Second, violent accidents include both homicide and other forms of
violent deaths, including job related accidents. Yet, descriptive evidence backs our
emerging story of a positive relationship between mineral discoveries and crime,
which is particularly strong if discoveries occurred before formal institutions were
in place. The rate of violent death, defined as the proportion of violent deaths over
total mortality, is highest in 1923 Wyoming (20.32%), a state which experienced
several “early” discoveries, and lowest in 1918 New Hampshire (3.27%), a state
which never experienced any discovery. Previous literature on historical crime,
such as Eriksson (2013) has used censuses of prisons. This data is of less use
to us, not only because the reasons for imprisonment are often unspecified but
also because its availability and quality are endogenous to the quality of state
institutions.
5 Contemporary evidence
In this section, we present evidence that today’s violence is related to counties’
mining history.
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5.1 Data
Contemporary data is from the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program Data
by the United States Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation.
UCR data provides information on 43 types of offenses and the monthly count
of arrests for each offense in more than 17, 000 reporting agencies. Because the
number of reporting agencies has been increasing over the years, we use more
recent, more reliable data. Our independent variable consists of the average crime
rate per 100, 000 people in 2000, which we compute by merging UCR data with
the 2000 US census.16 To proxy for violence aimed at intimidation, we use the
rate of murder and aggravated assaults.
On average, there were 617 murders and aggravated assaults per 100, 000 people
across US counties in 2000. The rate of murders and assaults is much higher in
counties with mineral resources, at 881 per 100, 000 people against 511 in mineral
poor counties. Within mining counties, the rate of murders and assaults is more
than twice as high in early mining counties, with 1, 416 murders and aggravated
assaults per 100, 000 in 2000 compared to 603 in counties that experienced mineral
resources discoveries only after land organization. We turn to regression analysis
to test the robustness of this discrepancy.
5.2 Empirical strategy
We estimate the following specification:
Violencei = β0 + β1Miningi + β2Early Miningi + β3Xi + δs(i) + i, (2)
where Violencei captures today’s crime in county i. One of the main insights of the
theoretical background discussed in Section 2 is that a distinction should be made
between violence for the purpose of intimidation and violence for the purpose of
expropriation or the defense of property rights. We first consider as dependent
variable only violent crimes, i.e. murders and assaults, and then look at property
crime, i.e. robbery, burglary, and larceny.
The variable Miningi indicates the presence of any mine at any point in time
16All the results to come are unaffected if we consider the average for 2000-2007 instead.
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on the physical area of county i. Early Miningi is a dummy variable equal to unity
if minerals had been discovered in county i before the area was administratively
organized, that is to say before incorporation of the state in which county i is
situated, or before incorporation of county i to a state. Xi is a vector of historical
and contemporary controls. δs(i) is a vector of state dummies.
Identification of expression (2) requires that discoveries are independent both
of contemporary violence and of the interactive effect of discoveries and territorial
status at the time of discovery. The presence of minerals is exogenous and the
specificity of mineral exploration that we have already discussed implies quasi-
exogeneity of territorial status at the precise time of a particular discovery. How-
ever, the independence of contemporary violence, mineral discoveries and their
precise timing would be jeopardized if some variable not included in expression
(2) influenced discoveries, their timing, and historical violence, and if violence
persisted over time. To alleviate this concern, we include in Xi a wide range of
historical and contemporary characteristics. In particular, to avoid confounding
the effects of mineral discovery relative to state development from that of the the
age of institutions, we control for the initial date at which the county was orga-
nized. We also control for population density, which was the main driver of county
incorporation. A potential criticism to our approach is that territorial status may
capture more than political development. To address this concern, we use a large
number of historical covariates that aim to capture economic and social dimen-
sions of development. In addition to the share of women in the population in
1880, we add manufactured, agricultural and other farming products outputs, and
population density measured in 1880, as well as manufacturing wage, white and
black literacy rates, and county’s population in 1900. The choice of these dates is
driven by a trade-off between measuring variables as close as possible to the date
of mineral discoveries and the loss of observations inherent to going back further in
time. These choices result in a sample of 2, 015 counties. Contemporary controls
include the shares of blacks and women in the population, ethnic fractionalization,
Gini coefficient, population density, urbanization rate, aggregate income, and per
capita income. We also control for the presence of coal mines and oil/gas mines.17
17Availability of data does not allow us to distinguish whether the discovery of oil, gas or coal
has been achieved before incorporation or not. We only have the information on whether a mine
16
Unless otherwise specified, all regressions are estimated on this sample and with
White heteroskedastic standard errors adjusted for clustering at the state level.
Descriptive statistics of variables are presented in Table A3 in the appendix.
A particular concern is that mining on unincorporated lands may have at-
tracted particularly violent individuals, who then transmitted their violent traits
to their offspring, explaining a higher prevalence of violence in these counties to-
day. While we cannot completely rule out this possibility, a number of factors
temper this concern. First, there is no evidence of adverse selection of miners
in the West compared to the rest of the population. In fact, it is quite to the
contrary. Clay and Jones (2008) use data collected from the 1850 and 1852 cen-
sus of Population for California together with the 1% sample of the 1850 census
to compare the characteristics of those who went to California to the rest of the
population. Contrary to popular conception, they conclude that positive selection
occurred, with those migrating to California being more educated and more likely
to be from a middle class background. Second, state fixed effects are included in
the analysis. To jeopardize our identification, miners should have systematically
migrated to different areas within a given state in anticipation of the precise date
of incorporation of these counties and as a function of expected violence.
5.3 Results
We first test whether interpersonal violence today is higher in mining areas. The
first three columns of Table 2 present the estimated coefficients of equation (2)
from which we remove the early mining variable and vary the set of covariates.
The theoretical prediction is that the discovery of mineral resources fosters vio-
lence, but only in the absence of effective third-party enforcement. A test of this
prediction is implemented in columns 4 to 6 by adding the early mining dummy
to the specification. Regression results fully corroborate our prediction. The ef-
fect of mining completely vanishes as we introduce the early mining variable. In
contrast, the coefficient associated with early mining is positive and statistically
significant at the one percent confidence level. In other words, mining discoveries
are positively and robustly associated with higher interpersonal violence, but only
was operated in a given county since 1945.
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in counties in which some minerals were discovered before the rule of law was in
place. The effect is robust to controlling for the wide range of historical controls
discussed above.
Another theoretical prediction is that the effect of resource abundance con-
ditional on the absence of rule of law is different for different types of violence.
More specifically, we predict that it affects violence for intimidation (as illustrated
by the previous estimation results using violent crime) but not violence aimed at
expropriation. We test this prediction in the first column of Table 3, which dis-
plays the estimated coefficients of a specification identical to the one in the fourth
column of Table 2, but with property crime (robbery, burglary, and larceny) as
the dependent variable. There is no evidence of any relationship between early
mining history and today’s rate of property crime. As illustrated by the results
presented in subsequent columns of Table 3, we do not find any evidence of any
effect of mining history on other crimes such as sex offense, drunk driving, forgery,
or vagrancy. This further advocates a specific relationship between mining history
and the use of interpersonal violence for intimidation.
5.4 Robustness checks
Our identification strategy relies on a comparison across space within the same
state. This may raise three particular concerns. First, a county may have been
affected by the mining history of its neighbors. Second, counties located near state
boundaries may share characteristics not captured by state fixed effects. Finally,
mineral resources endowment is not evenly distributed across space. In Table 4, we
pursue a number of strategies to tackle these concerns. We first use the estimation
method developed by Hsiang (2010) to take into account spatial correlation. In
column 1, standard errors are adjusted for spatial correlation adjustment with a
300-kilometers radius. Standard errors appear to be very similar to those previ-
ously estimated.
In column 2, we restrict the sample to counties that are either mining counties
or that are immediate neighbors of mining counties. While the point estimate of
the variable of interest is lower, it still has the same order of magnitude. We apply
a similar but different strategy in column 3 where we restrict the sample to states
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where the three types of counties – i.e. mining, early mining and non-mining –
coexist. Given the use of state fixed effects, these states, located in the West, are
those who allow us to identify the relations we are interested in – the other states
contributing only to the estimation of covariates. This approach leaves our point
estimates and their statistical significance fairly unchanged.
In columns 4 to 6, we address the issue that the borders of states may not
reflect the geological characteristics that are relevant for mineral discoveries. We
cut the United States using arbitrary 2−, 5− and 7−degree grids. We use these
groups to replace state fixed effects and we adjust standard errors at this level.
Estimated coefficients of early mining are lower the wider the squares of the grid,
but still the effect on this variable on today’s violence persists.
Finally, we show in columns 7 and 8 of Table 4 that results are not sensitive to
the use of propensity score matching as an alternative estimation method. Given
that all early mining counties are by construction also mining countries, it is not
possible to estimate both effects simultaneously. We thus start in column 7 by
matching mining and non-mining counties on the basis of observable character-
istics. We obtain a positive treatment effect that is not statistically significant.
Then, we match early mining and mining counties on the basis of observable char-
acteristics in column 8. We obtain a positive and significant treatment effect that
is of the same order of magnitude as former estimates.
Another possible concern regarding our identification strategy is that we com-
pare mineral discoveries that occurred before organization of the land to mineral
discoveries that occurred anytime between land organization and today. One may
thus be inclined to worry that we do not capture an effect due to land organi-
zation at the moment of discoveries, but rather simply an effect due to ancient
mining activity. We show here that there is some credence to our interpretation
and less to this alternative one. To do so, we zoom in on each county’s history
and observed discoveries that occurred within a small time window around land
organization. More precisely, we constructed a dummy variable equal to unity if
mineral resources were discovered up to five years prior ro land organization, and
a dummy variable if mineral resources were discovered up to five years after. We
then used these variables to replace the early mining dummy in (2). Estimated
coefficients are presented in column 9 of Table 4. While discoveries up to five years
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prior to land organization have a positive effect that lies just above the 10% sta-
tistical significance threshold, discoveries up to five years after land organization
have an unambiguously non-significant effect. We undertake the same exercise in
column 10 using a 10-year window and reach a similar conclusion.
The results presented here support the existence of a robust positive correlation
between discoveries in the absence of the rule of law and interpersonal violence
today.
6 Persistence and the political resource curse
In this section, we explore how and why discoveries more than a hundred years
ago are still associated with homicide today. We suggest the homicide resource
curse as a mechanism for a political resource curse. Initial violence might have
deleterious effects on the quality of subsequent institutions, through several direct
and indirect channels. Tabellini (2008) and Belloc and Bowles (2013) suggest that
social norms and institutions are complements, so that inefficient institutions may
arise simply due to the presence of violence and the tendency to resolve conflict
not through formal means but though informal, violent ones. An indirect channel
possibility is that the use of force enables violent agents to accumulate substantial
power. When the state arrives, these individuals have the incentives and the
financial resources to corrupt and shape nascent formal institutions in the aim of
preserving their rents. We first describe the data and document the existence of a
political resource curse in early mining areas.
6.1 Data and empirical methodology
The legal prerogatives of counties and municipalities generally involve some di-
mension of law enforcement, but judicial and legislative powers lie at the state
or federal level. Data on local law enforcement at the county level, particularly
historical data, is very limited, and only consist in the number of police or police
budgets, which are difficult to interpret because it is endogenous to crime.
Because of these conceptual and data availability considerations, we turn to
a well accepted measure of the quality of judicial institutions at the state level.
20
We rely on Epstein et al. (2001)’s measures of judicial quality in a state panel
available yearly from 1866 (or the date of statehood) to 2000. Appointment and
retention methods, as well as length of the terms of state Supreme Court Judges
are taken as measures of independence of the judiciary. The first variable consists
in the nomination procedures for state judges. It is equal to 0 if judges are ap-
pointed, to 1 if they are elected through partisan elections, and to 2 if they are
elected through non-partisan elections. Direct appointment of state judges by the
legislature is considered to be the most restrictive of judicial independence, and
non-partisan elections to lead to the highest independence of judges Epstein et al.
(2001). The second measure considers nomination and retention procedures. The
third variable consists in the length of state judges’s terms, which vary from 1 to 25
years throughout the period. The last variable is a dummy indicating the presence
of intermediary appellate courts. Longer terms and the presence of intermediary
appellate courts indicate more judicial independence.
Our aim is to study how mineral discoveries affect institutional quality. We
regress yearly judicial quality indicator indices on the number of mineral discoveries
that occurred during the preceding period. The analysis controls for state fixed
effects, which remove the influence of potential heterogeneity across states in the
development of institutions, as well as for year fixed effects, which capture general
trends in the development of institutions. We estimate the following equation:
IQst = β0 + β1Miningst + δs + δt + st, (3)
where IQst denotes each of our different measures of judicial institutions quality in
state s at time t. Each measure is scaled such that a higher value indicates higher
judicial independence. Miningst denotes the total number of mineral discoveries
in state s at time t. δs and δt are state and year fixed effects, and st is the error
term.
In the second step of the analysis, we distinguish between states in which some
mineral discoveries had occurred before complete incorporation and states that
were completely established before any mineral was discovered. This distinction
is introduced in order to test our model, which predicts that the acquisition of
economic power is only possible in areas in which violence is not illegal. Thus, the
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deterioration in institutional quality should be observed in those instances only.
We estimate the following specification:
IQst = β0 + β1Miningst + β2Miningst × Early Minings + δs + δt + st, (4)
where Early Minings is a dummy variable taking the value of unity if a mineral
discovery occurred in any county of state s before the state was incorporated
into the Union, or before the county was incorporated into the state.18 All other
variables are identical to those defined in expression (3). Because state fixed effects
are included in the specification, the interactive term is correctly estimated.
6.2 Results
Figure 3 illustrates the main argument. It displays the evolution of (i) the nom-
ination procedure for state judges; (ii) a combination index of nomination and
retention methods of state judges; (iii) the length of terms of state judges; and
(iv) the presence of an intermediary appellate court, for states without mineral
discoveries, for states with mineral discoveries after the organization of the land
and for “early mining” states.
In the period following the 19th century and up until the second World War,
there is a large difference in nomination procedures for state judges between early
mining states and others. In early mining states, judges are predominantly ap-
pointed, whereas the prevalence of elections is much larger in late mining or non
mining states. This gap closes quickly around the time of the second World War,
when the importance of mineral exploitation in the American economy sharply de-
clined (David and Wright 1995). In other words, judicial independence was lower
in states with early mineral discoveries and the gap was widened with each addi-
tional discovery, but the gap began closing as the rents associated with mineral
discoveries started to decline. The independence of both selection and retention of
state judges exhibits the same pattern, but the difference persists for longer. The
length of judges’ tenure is much shorter in mining states, which is indicative of
18States in which some early discovery occurred are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Louisiana, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wash-
ington, and Wyoming.
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less independent judges, but there is no statistically significant difference between
early and late mining states.
Estimation results of specifications (3) and (4) presented in Table 5 confirm
these broad patterns. For each dependent variable, the first column considers the
relationship between judicial institutional quality and mineral discoveries. Min-
eral discoveries are negatively associated with judicial independence, illustrating
the presence of a political resource curse. The effect is statistically significant for
nomination and retention procedures. However, as indicated in the second column
for each variable, the effect is entirely driven by early mining states. Selection
and retention procedures, terms of judges, and presence of intermediary appellate
courts in a given year and in a given state are not affected by mineral discover-
ies in states that were incorporated to the Union well before minerals were first
discovered. However, all measures of judicial independence are negatively affected
by mineral discoveries in states in which at least some of the discoveries occurred
before full state incorporation to the Union.
The magnitude of the effect is substantial. In a state where some discoveries
occurred before incorporation, mineral discoveries are associated with a 2.5% re-
duction in the measure of independence of selection procedure for state judges, a
5% reduction in their terms lengths, and a 1.7% reduction in the likelihood that
an intermediary appellate court is present.
These results mirror those obtained for violence. We put forward the homicide
resource curse as a mechanism for the political resource curse through the direct
and indirect channels discussed in the preamble to this section.
6.3 Robustness checks
The results are robust to using logit, or ordered logit specifications in the relevant
cases. The results are also robust to clustering standard errors both at the year
and state level and to correcting for serial and spatial correlation (Hsiang 2010).
We include lags of discoveries in order to investigate dynamic effects. Results
are displayed in Table A1 in the appendix. The effect is quite persistent over time,
except for the length of terms of state judges, for which the effect is no longer
significant after two periods. This may be due to the fact that term length is more
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easily adjustable than nomination and retention procedures.
A potential concern here is that these results are not due to the causal ef-
fect of mineral discoveries but to unobservable state level characteristics that are
correlated with poor institutional quality. Since we control in all regressions for
state and year fixed effects, such state characteristics should be varying over time
in order to jeopardize causal identification. This substantially restricts the set of
possible contestants. One possibility is that mineral discoveries generated short
term immigration of a poorly educated and disenfranchised population, explaining
the observed deterioration in institutional quality. Two elements argue against this
possibility. First, as we have noted before, Clay and Jones (2008) find that mi-
grants were positively selected to mining areas, in terms of education and income.
Second, we perform a falsification test and find that measures of competitive-
ness of national politics (Besley et al. 2010) are affected by mineral discoveries,
but without distinction between early and late mining states (see Table A2 in
the appendix). Moreover, the effect on the competitiveness in general elections
is positive, which suggests that if anything, the relationship between mining and
institutional quality is upwardly biased.
As argued in Section 2, both initial violence and quality of subsequent institu-
tions can affect social norms. We attempted to test this hypothesis with data on
attitudes towards the use of interpersonal violence from the General Social Survey.
However, data is only available in 300 out of about 3,000 US counties. This sub-
sample of counties is geographically clustered within each state. As a consequence,
there is virtually no variation in mineral resources endowment between counties
of the same state surveyed in the General Social Survey. Although we are unable
to document the cultural legacy, the review of the literature in 2 suggests that it
would go in the same direction as the institutional legacy: one should expect more
violent norms where institutions are of lower quality.
7 Conclusion
This work documents the negative short- and long-run consequences of mineral
discoveries in the context of weak polities. It uncovers the existence of a homicide
resource curse, which is conditional on the quality of formal institutions. In areas
24
of the US in which mineral discoveries occurred before the formal rule of law was
established, violence spiked up and higher levels of interpersonal violence have
persisted until today.
We also illustrate the existence of a political resource curse in the US and sug-
gests interpersonal violence as an underlying mechanism. Mineral discoveries are
negatively associated with the quality of judicial institutions, but only in states
that had experienced mineral discoveries before full incorporation. The prevalence
of violence concomitant to discoveries in these places may explain the deteriora-
tion of formal institutional quality through direct and indirect channels, namely if
violence endowed agents with substantial resources available corrupt nascent po-
litical institutions. In turn, the persistence of institutions has paved the way to
the persistence of the homicide resource curse.
We also provide a new interpretation for the economic role of interpersonal
violence. Violence that aims at intimidating potential partners plays a crucial role
in determining surplus allocation. Because this type of violence is efficient, it is
observable by the econometrician, in contrast with violence aimed at expropriation.
An implication is that as the rule of law progresses, only an effect on violence for
intimidation rather than violence for expropriation will be observed. We thereby
reconcile the robust yet puzzling result of the crime literature that violent crime
is much more responsive to policing than property crime.
Our findings on interpersonal violence also mirror three robust findings of the
literature on political violence. First, violence is the hallmark of weak polities.
Second, the presence of natural resources is an important driver of violence in
the context of weak institutions, where it can lead to the further debilitation of
institutions. Third, because institutions are persistent and because violence often
begets more violence, countries can be trapped in an unfortunate equilibrium of
poor quality institutions and high violence.
One criticism to our approach is that our proxy for state development may also
capture other dimensions of political, economic, and social development. We ad-
dress this issue by controlling for a large number of historical proxies for economic
and social development, but some dimensions may be still remain unobserved.
Even so, were territorial status to encompass more than the rule of law, the pol-
icy recommendation remains identical. Early mining, before strong and impartial
polities are developed, has deleterious and lasting effects on interpersonal violence
and on institutional quality.
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Figure 1: Distributions of counties’ incorporation dates and mineral discoveries.
Histograms of the distributions of dates of county first creation (in blue) and dates of mineral discoveries (in
yellow). Sources: National Association of Counties, and Mineral Resources Data System.
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Figure 2: Map of US counties, distinguishing between mining and early mining
counties.
Sources: Atlas of Historical County Boundaries and Mineral Resources Data System.
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Figure 3: Institutional quality and mineral discoveries.
Sources: Epstein et al. (2001) and Mineral Resources Data System.
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Table 1: Historical relationship between mining and homicides in a handful of
counties.
Dependent variable: number of homicides in county i at time t
(1) (2) (3)
Stock of minesit 0.187** 0.237*** 0.260***
(0.090) (0.087) (0.088)
Population (thousands)it 0.278*** 0.351***
(0.043) (0.050)
Stock of Minesit × Early miningi 3.700***
(0.922)
Observations 357 329 329
Adjusted R-squared 0.155 0.349 0.389
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions. Each
column presents the estimates from a separate regression. The dependent variable is the number of homicides in
county i at time t. Stock of mines is the cumulative sum of mineral discoveries over the 1849–1895 period. Early
miningi is a dummy variable equal to unity if the county i experienced mineral resources discoveries before land
organization. All regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a constant term.
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Table 2: Relationship between mining history and today’s violent crimes.
Dependent variable: rate of violent crimes per 100, 000 inhabitants in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mining county 6.29 40.09* 38.75* -23.45 7.17 5.74
(32.16) (23.76) (21.53) (33.08) (20.99) (18.80)
Early mining 181.30** 202.53*** 208.65***
(70.04) (58.25) (60.11)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemporary controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Historical controls Yes Yes
Observations 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.39 0.40 0.28 0.40 0.41
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White heteroskedastic standard errors adjusted for clustering at the state
level in parentheses. OLS regressions. Each column presents the estimates from a separate regression. 2, 015
observations in each regression. Violent crimes include murders and aggravated assaults. Mining county is a
dummy variable equal to unity if the county had any mining activity. Early mining is a dummy variable equal
to unity if the county experienced mineral resources discoveries before land organization. All regressions include
state fixed effects and a constant term. All regressions include the date of creation of the county and the following
Contemporary controls measured in 2000: (log of) county’s aggregate income, (log of) income per capita, shares
of blacks and women in the population, fractionalization, Gini coefficient, population density, and urbanization
rate. Historical controls include the following covariates: manufacturing wage, white and black literacy rates, and
county’s population in 1900, manufactured, agricultural and other farming products outputs, population density,
and share of women in 1880, and dummies for the presence of any coal or oil/gas mine.
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Table 3: Relationship between mining history and today’s property crimes and
other crimes.
Dependent variables: rate of different crimes per 100, 000 inhabitants in 2000
Property Sex Drunk
crimes offense driving Forgery Vagrancy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mining county -24.40 -0.89 10.23 0.13 -0.01
(20.18) (2.96) (13.91) (3.74) (1.00)
Early mining 45.50 12.19 20.62 2.44 -0.67
(48.15) (7.97) (27.89) (5.84) (2.55)
Observations 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,015
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 0.26 0.61 0.24 0.11
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White heteroskedastic standard errors adjusted for clustering at the state level
in parentheses. OLS regressions. Each column presents the estimates from a separate regression. Property crimes
include robbery, burglary, and larceny. Mining county is a dummy variable equal to unity if the county had any
mining activity. Early mining is a dummy variable equal to unity if the county experienced mineral resources
discoveries before land organization. All regressions include state fixed effects and a constant term. All regressions
include all contemporary and historical covariates used in Table 2.
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Table 5: Relationship between mining and the quality of judicial institutions.
Dependent variables in columns’ head
Selection procedure Retention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Miningst -1.75* -0.06 -2.82* -0.52
(0.89) (0.30) (1.61) (0.58)
Early minings × Miningst -2.57*** -4.23**
(0.96) (1.75)
Observations 6,480 6,480 6,170 6,170
R-squared 0.66 0.66 0.85 0.85
Length of terms Appellate court
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Miningst -3.00 -0.11 -0.45 0.68**
(2.34) (1.25) (0.59) (0.31)
Early minings × Miningst -5.34** -1.72**
(2.58) (0.70)
Observations 6,170 6,170 6,480 6,480
R-squared 0.90 0.90 0.67 0.67
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions. Each
column presents the estimates from a separate regression. Selection procedure is the selection procedure for state
judges; Retention is an indicator of the independence of both selection and retention of state judges; Length of
terms is the length of terms of state judges; and Appellate court is the presence of an intermediary appellate
court. For each dependent variable, a higher value indicates higher judicial independence. Miningst is a dummy
variable equal to unity if state s had any mining discovery at time t. Early minings is a dummy variable equal to
unity if state s experienced mineral resources discoveries before land organization. All regressions include state
fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a constant term.
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Appendix
Table A1: Relationship between mining and the quality of judicial institutions,
including lagged discoveries.
Dependent variables in columns’ head
Selection procedure Retention Length of terms Appellate court
Miningst -0.31 -0.53 0.22 0.43***
(0.23) (0.36) (0.56) (0.15)
Minings,t−1 -0.04 -0.25 -0.04 0.34*
(0.17) (0.30) (0.62) (0.17)
Minings,t−2 0.11 -0.17 -0.38 0.24
(0.13) (0.27) (0.72) (0.14)
Minings,t−3 0.20 -0.07 -0.40 0.23
(0.13) (0.29) (0.74) (0.16)
Minings,t−4 0.41* 0.22 -0.48 0.09
(0.21) (0.28) (0.66) (0.14)
Early minings × Miningst -1.50** -2.30* -3.56** -1.09***
(0.62) (1.16) (1.73) (0.37)
Early minings × Minings,t−1 -1.41*** -1.98** -2.78* -0.92***
(0.51) (0.94) (1.44) (0.34)
Early minings × Minings,t−2 -1.34*** -1.66** -1.85 -0.82**
(0.47) (0.80) (1.20) (0.31)
Early minings × Minings,t−3 -1.60*** -2.51** -2.02* -0.90**
(0.54) (0.96) (1.20) (0.34)
Early minings × Minings,t−4 -1.75*** -2.93*** -1.75 -0.78**
(0.63) (1.05) (1.44) (0.37)
Observations 6,476 6,166 6,166 6,476
R-squared 0.67 0.85 0.90 0.67
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions. Each
column presents the estimates from a separate regression. Selection Procedure is the selection procedure for state
judges; Retention is an indicator of the independence of both selection and retention of state judges; Length of
terms is the length of terms of state judges; and Appellate court is the presence of an intermediary appellate
court. For each dependent variable, a higher value indicates higher judicial independence. Miningst is a dummy
variable equal to unity if state s had any mining discovery at time t. Early minings is a dummy variable equal to
unity if state s experienced mineral resources discoveries before land organization. All regressions include state
fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a constant term.
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Table A2: Relationship between mining history and political competition at the
national level.
Dependent Variable: Political competition in general elections
(1) (2)
Miningst 0.33*** 0.44***
(0.10) (0.10)
Early Minings × Miningst -0.19
(0.11)
Observations 772 772
R-squared 0.55 0.55
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses. OLS regressions. Each
column presents the estimates from a separate regression. Miningst is a dummy variable equal to unity if state s
had any mining discovery at time t. Early minings is a dummy variable equal to unity if the county s experienced
mineral resources discoveries before land organization. All regressions include state fixed effects, year fixed effects,
and a constant term.
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Table A3: Summary statistics for the relationship between mining history and
today’s violent crimes.
Full sample Mining counties Early mining counties
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
In 2000:
Violent crimes per 100, 000 inhabitants 520.82 329.05 623.34 323.42 655.79 341.88
Aggregate income (log of) 20.01 1.47 20.57 1.77 20.12 1.88
Per capita income (log of) 9.49 0.24 9.55 0.29 9.53 0.30
Share of blacks 0.10 0.15 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.01
Share of women 0.51 0.02 0.50 0.02 0.5 0.02
Fractionalization 0.25 0.18 0.33 0.18 0.29 0.16
Gini coefficient 0.43 0.04 0.43 0.03 0.43 0.03
Population density 232.3 1293.58 305.15 1120.09 124.88 291.42
Urbanization rate 0.43 0.30 0.56 0.30 0.54 0.32
Date of creation 1793.3 67.4 1817.37 63.78 1853.22 22.76
In 1900:
Manufacturing wage 1012548 6560182 784613 2954666 252269 556000
White literacy rate 5368 12147 4427 7492 2567 2576
White literacy rate 412 816 175 412 7 15
Population 8538 24212 7061 12761 4192 4272
In 1880:
Farming output 954936 1248379 444911 837506 192954 429809
Other farming products output 882071 917558 636151 1037276 292766 507688
Manufactured output 2330518 16154217 1540540 7536783 309740 600072
Population density 65.71 834.2 47.03 298.12 8 17.17
Share of women 0.47 0.06 0.41 0.10 0.36 0.11
Coal mine 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.22
Oil or gas mine 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25
Observations 2,015 209 58
See the text and notes of Table 2.
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